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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental principles of due process of law is fair
notice to an ordinary person of what is prohibited.' "[A] statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
*Mr. Farr is a member of the Raleigh law firm of Maupin, Taylor, Ellis &
Adams, P.A.; B.L.S. 1976, Hillsdale College, Michigan; J.D. 1979, Emory Univer-
sity; LL.M. 1983, Georgetown University.
. 1. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essen-
tial of due process of law."' Due process requires that laws provide
standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.3
"[Liaws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to . . .
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis . . .
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted the Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act in 1969.' The original purpose of
the act was to protect consumers from predatory business prac-
tices.' Nonetheless, the North Carolina Supreme Court has sanc-
tioned an expanded application of the act to cases involving so-
phisticated commercial parties.7 This article will attempt to
demonstrate that it is poor public policy to apply section 75-1.1 to
cases based upon an alleged breach of a commercial contract and
that in at least those instances section 75-1.1 is unconstitutionally
vague.
II. THE CASE HISTORY OF SECTION 75-1.1
Private parties have been granted a cause of action under sec-
tion 75-1.1 provided they can prove injury caused by a violation of
the act.8 Section 75-1.1 is based upon section 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.9 State courts have therefore looked to fed-
2. Id.
3. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
4. Id. at 108-09; see also Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-
03 (1966) (a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is
so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it
prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed stan-
dards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1969) (hereinafter, "the act" or "section 75-1.1").
6. Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the
North Carolina Attorney General in the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1 (1969).
7. Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 261-62, 266 S.E.2d
610, 620 (1980).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1985); see also Ellis v. Smith-Broadhurst, Inc., 48
N.C. App. 180, 184, 268 S.E.2d 271, 273-74 (1980) (statute provided remedy for
unfair trade practices in insurance industry); Mayton v. Hiatt's Used Cars Inc., 45
N.C. App. 206, 211-12, 262 S.E.2d 860, 864 (1980) (in order to be prevailing party
within meaning of attorney fee provision, plaintiff must prove violation of statute
and actual injury).
9. Morgan, supra, note 6, at 19; 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1971) (hereinafter,
"FTC Act").
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eral decisions for guidance in construing section 75-1.1."°
The leading North Carolina case construing the substantive
scope of section 75-1.1 is Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
Co." In Johnson, the court pronounced that the act cannot be
"limited to precise acts and practices" and that whether a practice
violates the act "depends upon the facts of each case and the im-
pact the practice has on the market place.' 1 2 The court adopted
carte blanche principles used to define unfair and deceptive acts
under the FTC Act:
The concept of "unfairness" is broader than and includes the con-
cept of "deception". A practice is unfair when it offends estab-
lished public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, un-
ethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to
consumers.
. . . An act or practice is deceptive . . . if it has the capacity
or tendency to deceive. Proof of actual deception is unnecessary.
Though words and sentences may be framed so that they are lit-
erally true, they may still be deceptive. In determining whether a
representation is deceptive, its effect on the average consumer is
considered. 3
The Johnson court synthesized these "principles" by conclud-
ing that the "essence" of an unfair trade practice is "conduct
which amounts to an inequitable assertion of . . . power or posi-
tion."' 4 This summary arguably describes the conduct by the re-
spondents in all of the FTC cases cited in Johnson. In Spiegel,
Inc. v. FTC,1 5 a catalogue retailer was ordered to cease and desist
from using a long arm statute to obtain jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents to collect on retail accounts. In Goodman v. FTC,16 the peti-
tioner was ordered to cease and desist from recruiting students for
a home study course by distributing ads found by the FTC to be
misleading. In Trans World Accounts v. FTC," a debt collection
10. State ex rel. Edmisten v. J. C. Penny Co., 292 N.C. 311, 315, 233 S.E.2d
895, 898 (1977).
11. 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
12. Id. at 262-63, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
13. Id. at 263, 265-66, 266 S.E.2d at 621-22 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 264, 266 S.E.2d at 622.
15. 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
16. 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957).
17. 594 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1979).
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agency was ordered to cease and desist from debt collection prac-
tices found by the FTC to have an intimidating effect on debtors.
In the other eight cases cited in Johnson,8 companies were or-
dered to cease and desist from running advertisements after the
FTC had concluded that the ads tended to deceive or mislead
consumers.
The FTC cases cited in Johnson have several common
threads. All of the cases pitted consumers against corporations. In
all of the cases, consumers were practically unable to protect their
interests due to a perceived imbalance of economic power. All of
the cases but two concerned efforts to solicit purchases of rela-
tively inexpensive products or services from consumers through
misleading mass advertising. In all of the cases, the average con-
sumer lacked the ability to verify claims made in advertisements.
In short, all of the cases involved obvious corporate "conduct
which amount[ed] to an inequitable assertion of its power or posi-
tion" over individual consumers.19
All of the corporations defending in the FTC cases cited in
Johnson lost their appeals in the federal circuit courts. Yet, in not
one of those cases was the losing corporation ordered to pay a pen-
alty. The corporations were instead merely ordered to cease and
desist from engaging in a specific practice which was clearly identi-
fied in an FTC cease and desist order.
In contrast, under section 75-1.1, defendants can face treble
damages of millions of dollars in excess of compensatory damages
merely due to a possible breach of contract or a breach of war-
ranty. 0 Courts have responded to the inequitable effect of huge
18. Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963); United States Retail
Credit Assn. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1962); Charles of the Ritz Distributors
Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944); FTC v. Hires Turner Glass Co., 81 F.2d
362 (3d Cir. 1935); Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., MacKenzie v. United States, 423 U.S. 827 (1975);
Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953); FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d
669 (2d Cir. 1963); Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
19. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 264, 266 S.E.2d at 622; see also Coble v. Richardson
Corp. of Greensboro, 71 N.C. App. 511, 520, 322 S.E.2d 817, 824 (1984) (oral rep-
resentations by developer in sale of residence to plaintiff); Libby Hill Seafood
Restaurants, Inc. v. Owens, 62 N.C. App. 695, 700, 303 S.E.2d 565, 569, cert. de-
nied, 309 N.C. 321, 307 S.E.2d 164 (1983) (corporate purchaser knew land it
bought had been trash dump, but conducted no independent land investigation).
20. One example is the case of Village Cable, Inc. v. Oak Communication,
Inc., No. C-82-805-D, (M.D.N.C. July 11, 1984), afJ'd, No. 84-2221, (4th Cir. June
6, 1985). The plaintiff in Oak purchased cable television converter-decoders from
[Vol. 8:421424
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treble damage awards by fashioning theoretical limits to the act.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that a breach of
express or implied warranties standing alone does not constitute a
violation of section 75-1.1.2" In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals has found that "substantial aggravating circum-
stances" must be present to justify an award of treble damages
when a violation is based upon an alleged breach of contract."
Judicial efforts to restrict the act's sweep run counter to the
ruling by the state supreme court in Marshall v. Miller.23 In Mar-
shall, the court ruled that good faith is not a defense to an unfair
trade practice claim and that plaintiffs are not required to prove
scienter by the defendant.2 ' The ruling in Marshall eliminates the
possibility of meaningful distinction of cases involving mere
breaches of contract from cases involving "substantial aggravating
circumstances." The reported cases consistently lack any substan-
tive analysis. 5 Courts typically recite the facts of each case and
then offer a conclusion as to whether the defendant has violated
the act."
the defendant for use in the plaintiff's cable television operations. The plaintiff's
claims were based upon an alleged breach of warranty. The plaintiff also alleged
claims for fraud and unfair trade practices. The district court granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the unfair trade practice claim on the ground
that defendant's conduct had not been shown to be "substantially aggravating."
Id., slip op. at 17. Had the court denied defendant's motion, defendant faced the
prospect of alleged damages of $10,000,000 in compensatory damages and
$30,000,000 in treble damages.
21. Coble v. Richardson Corp., 71 N.C. App. 511, 520, 322 S.E.2d 817, 824
(1984); Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Smith, 44 N.C. App. 685, 691, 262 S.E.2d
646, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 379, 268 S.E.2d 685 (1980).
22. United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 992 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft
Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 715-16 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983).
23. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
24. 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 401.
25. Comment, The Trouble with Trebles: What Violates § 75-1.1, 5 CAMP-
BELL L. REV. 119, 127-32 (1982).
26. Id.; More recent decisions are equally inconsistent and conclusory. Levine
v. Parks Chevrolet, 76 N.C. App. 44, 331 S.E.2d 747 (1985) (seller of truck with
incorrect odometer reading guilty of unfair trade practice); Goodrich v. Rice, 75
N.C. App. 530, 331 S.E.2d 195 (1985) (builder's receipt of funds prior to time set
by contract for payment did not constitute an unfair trade practice); Cockman v.
White, 76 N.C. App. 387, 333 S.E.2d 54 (1985) ("misunderstanding" between in-
surance agent and insured regarding extent of coverage is not an unfair trade
practice) accord Canady v. Hardin, 71 N.C. App. 156, 321 S.E.2d 474 (1984); Win-
ston Realty Co., Inc. v. G.H.G. Inc., 70 N.C. App. 374, 320 S.E.2d 286, aff'd, 314
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III. THE AMBIGUITY OF SECTION 75-1.1 RENDERS IT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED IN COMMERCIAL CASES
A. Section 75-1.1 Is Unconstitutional Whether It Is Viewed as a
Penal Statute or Economic Legislation
The vagueness doctrine has its widest scope in two areas: (1)
cases involving first amendment freedoms, 27 and (2) cases involving
statutes that are penal in nature. 28 A lower standard of judicial re-
view applies to legislation that is strictly economic in nature.29
Under section 75-1.1, it is the responsibility of the fact finder
to ascertain the facts and the responsibility of the court to deter-
mine whether the defendant has violated the statute.3" Because
section 75-1.1 allows courts to decide from case to case whether
particular conduct is prohibited, the act expressly "delegates basic
policy matters . . . to judges . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis." 3'
The act's delegation of policy-making authority to courts has
resulted in "arbitrary and discriminatory" application.32 Obedient
to the mandate from the North Carolina Supreme Court that the
sweep of section 75-1.1 not be limited to "precise acts," the North
Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he breadth and
scope [of section 75-1.1] requires no elaboration . . . .- As so
construed, the act is at least as vague as numerous statutes
N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985) (personnel agency committed an unfair trade prac-
tice by failing to check references as warranted); Kim v. Professional Business
Brokers, Ltd., 74 N.C. App. 125, 328 S.E.2d 296 (1985) (purchaser of hotel enti-
tled to treble damages based upon a finding of fraud); Cathy's Boutique v. Win-
ston-Salem Joint Venture, 72 N.C. App. 641, 325 S.E.2d 283 (1985) (publication
of unfavorable cartoon in advertising supplement is not an unfair trade practice);
Strickland v. A & C Mobile Homes, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 768, 321 S.E.2d 16 (1984)
(seller of mobile homes committed unfair trade practice by falsely warranting to
pay moving expenses); Hall v. T. L. Kemp Jewelry, Inc., 71 N.C. App. 101, 322
S.E.2d 7 (1984) (seller's failure to properly appraise jewelry is not an unfair trade
practice).
27. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972).
28. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
29. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489 (1982).
30. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 310, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975).
31. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-109.
32. Id.; see supra note 25.
33. Winston Realty Co., Inc. v. G.H.G., Inc., 70 N.C. App. 374, 381, 320
S.E.2d 286, 291 (1984) (emphasis supplied).
[Vol. 8:421
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stricken by the United States Supreme Court in recent years. 4
The vagueness of section 75-1.1 and the resulting unfairness to
defendants is accentuated in those cases where application of the
treble damage remedy has a severely penal effect. The penal effect
of huge treble damage awards under section 75-1.1 cannot be logi-
cally distinguished from cases that preclude the award of stipu-
lated or liquidated damages. Liquidated damages may be collected,
but a penalty will not be enforced. Liquidated damages must be
reasonably proportionate to the damages actually caused by a
breach of contract or a reasonable estimate of the damage.3 6 Stipu-
lated damages are an unenforceable penalty when the sum "is
fixed, not as a pre-estimate of probable actual damages, but as a
punishment, the threat of which is designed to prevent the breach
"37
The limits on stipulated damages are consistent with the com-
mon law rule which prohibits the award of punitive damages for a
breach of contract.3 8 Punitive damages are not designed to com-
pensate the plaintiff, but are intended to punish the defendant and
to deter others.39 Punitive damages may be awarded only where
the wrong is done willfully or in reckless and wanton disregard of a
plaintiff's rights.40
34. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-96 (1979) (statute required doctors
performing abortions to adhere to prescribed standard of care for an aborted fetus
if "there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable."); Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (vagrancy statute requiring individuals to provide
"credible and reliable" identification when requested by a police officer); City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (regulation
required doctors performing abortions to "insure that the remains of the unborn
child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner."); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566 (1974) (statute prohibited the treatment of the American flag in a "con-
temptuous" manner); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (ordinance
prohibited persons from assembling on sidewalks and conducting themselves "in a
manner annoying to persons passing by . . ").
35. City of Kinston v. Suddreth, 266 N.C. 618, 620, 146 S.E.2d 660, 662
(1966); Ledbetter Brothers, Inc. v. N. C. Dept. of Transportation, 68 N.C. App.
97, 105, 314 S.E.2d 761, 767 (1984).
36. Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 361, 160 S.E.2d 29, 34 (1968).
37. City of Kinston, 266 N.C. at 620, 146 S.E.2d at 662 (quoting C. McCoR-
MICK, DAMAGES § 146 (1935)).
38. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 111, 229 S.E.2d 297, 301
(1976).
39. Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 134, 225
S.E.2d 797, 807 (1976).
40. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 306-07, 218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1975); see also
19861
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the very
idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past and to de-
ter future, unlawful conduct .. ."4 The North Carolina Supreme
Court has conceded that the award of treble damages under sec-
tion 75-1.1 "clearly serves as a deterrent to future violations" and
that section 75-1.1 is at least "partially" punitive in nature.4 2 Un-
like the traditional restrictions on punitive damages, under section
75-1.1 plaintiffs can recover millions above compensatory damages
without proving bad faith by the defendant. It is anomalous for
plaintiffs to recover enormous treble damage awards in breach of
contract cases where public policy prohibits defendants from vol-
untarily consenting to stipulated damages above actual damages.
The penal effect of section 75-1.1 in cases based upon a breach
of a commercial contract should render the statute unconstitu-
tional under the strict standard of judicial review applicable to pe-
nal statutes. This heightened standard has been applied to numer-
ous misdemeanor statutes which were significantly less penal than
the potential payout of millions of dollars in treble damages.43 The
Supreme Court has also applied the heightened standard of review
to strike statutes in cases where the financial "penalty" was sub-
stantially less than the millions that can be awarded under section
75-1.1. In Connally v. General Construction Co.," a state fair labor
standards law was found to be unconstitutionally vague despite the
fact that it authorized fines of only $50 to $500. Similarly, the stat-
ute stricken in Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania4 5 required the de-
fendant to pay court costs of $230.95 following his acquittal on a
criminal offense. Like the statute in Giaccio, section 75-1.1 "con-
tains no standards at all, nor does it place any conditions of any
kind upon the [court's] power to impose" treble damages. 46
"The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates- as
well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforce-
ment-depend in part on the nature of the enactment.' '4 7 Accord-
ingly, a more liberal standard of review applies if section 75-1.1 is
Ervin, Punitive Damages in North Carolina, 59 N.C.L. REV. 1255 (1981).
41. Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981).
42. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 546, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981).
43. See supra note 34.
44. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
45. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
46. 382 U.S. at 403.
47. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982).
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viewed as non-penal "economic" regulation. The Supreme Court
has articulated four principles applicable to economic regulation
challenged on the ground of vagueness:
[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test [1]
because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because
businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior care-
fully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of
action. [2] Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have the ability
to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by
resort to an administrative process. [3] The Court has also ex-
pressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than
criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are
qualitatively less severe. [4] And the Court has recognized that a
scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially
with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his
conduct is proscribed.48
The act does not pass constitutional muster even under these
more liberal principles. First, the vagueness of section 75-1.1
makes it impossible for defendants in breach of contract cases to
regulate their conduct by consulting either the statute or court de-
cisions. 9 Second, defendants have no resort to an administrative
agency. Third, the consequences of violating section 75-1.1 cannot
be said to be purely civil, but are instead in some cases severely
penal. Fourth, the vagueness of section 75-1.1 is not mitigated by a
requirement that plaintiffs prove "scienter" to recover treble
damages. 50
48. Id. at 498-99.
49. Section 75-1.1 does exclude from its coverage "professional services ren-
dered by a member of a learned profession." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b). The
phrase "learned profession" applies to physicians, attorneys and related profes-
sionals. Opinion of Attorney General to Representative R. L. Framer, 47 N.C.
Atty. Gen. 118 (1977). The act also contains a qualified exemption for the media.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(c). The following areas have been excluded through case
law: (1) landlord-tenant relationships-Threatt v. Hiers, 76 N.C. App. 521, 333
S.E.2d 772 (1985); (2) securities transactions-Skinner v. E. F. Hutton & Co.,
Inc., 314 N.C. 267, 333 S.E.2d 236 (1985) (citing Linder v. Durham Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985)); (3) employer-employee relationships-Buie v.
Daniel International Corp., 56 N.C. App. 445, 289 S.E.2d 118, cert. denied, 305
N.C. 759, 292 S.E.2d 574 (1982). The North Carolina Court of Appeals has also
held that the act does not create a cause of action against the State. Sperry Corp.
v. Patterson, 73 N.C. App. 123, 325 S.E.2d 642, 645 (1985).
50. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 546, 276 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1981).
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B. The Vagueness of Section 75-1.1 Is Not Ameliorated by Deci-
sions "Interpreting" the FTC Act
Conventional wisdom holds that the body of case law inter-
preting the FTC Act will insulate section 75-1.1 from claims of
vagueness.5 1 A vague statute can survive constitutional scrutiny
when it has been limited by judicial construction.5 2 However, fun-
damental distinctions between the two acts render futile any at-
tempt to define the scope of section 75-1.1 simply by reference to
FTC case law.
Unlike section 75-1.1, the FTC Act confers no private right of
action. 53 The sole means of enforcement of the FTC Act is through
the Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"). 54 The Commis-
sion is composed of five commissioners who are appointed by the
President of the United States with the advice and consent of the
United States Senate.5
The FTC Act is enforced by the Commission through the issu-
ance of administrative complaints. 5 A complaint may be issued
only where a proceeding by the Commission "would be in the in-
terest of the public. '5 7 Following an administrative hearing the
Commission may issue a cease and desist order that is based upon
the allegations in the complaint. An order may issue upon proof
that an act or practice has the capacity or tendency to deceive,
that it offends public policy, or that it is substantially injurious to
consumers.
5 8
A party aggrieved by a cease and desist order may seek review
in an appropriate federal court of appeals.5 9 Cease and desist or-
ders are directed to specific respondents named in the administra-
tive complaint and direct those respondents to cease and desist
from specific acts found by the Commission to be "unfair" or "de-
ceptive".8 0 Respondents are thus given actual notice of the types of
51. Morgan, supra note 6, at 19-20.
52. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.5.
53. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1929).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976).
57. Id.
58. Spiegel v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976). An identical standard
was adopted for § 75-1.1 in Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C.
247, 263, 265-66, 266 S.E.2d 610, 621-22 (1980).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1976).
60. Id.
430 [Vol. 8:421
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practices that violate the FTC act.6' Parties injured by violations
of the FTC act are not entitled to compensatory or punitive dam-
ages. Parties guilty of knowingly violating a final cease and desist
order or a Commission rule may be required to pay a fine of
$10,000 for each violation.62
Cases interpreting the FTC Act, including those cited in John-
son, are no more precise than the broad and ambiguous statutory
language. The FTC Act creates an "elusive" standard of conduct
which courts have been unable to define with any specificity. 3 Be-
cause of the elusive statutory standards, the Commission sits "like
a court of equity" and "considers public values beyond simply
those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the
antitrust laws. 6
4
The "elusive" standard of conduct proscribed by the FTC Act
does not render it unconstitutional for at least two reasons. First,
the only consequences facing respondents in FTC enforcement ac-
tions are cease and desist orders. The FTC Act is therefore strictly
"remedial" and "civil" in nature.65 Second, respondents in FTC
enforcement actions may resort to an extensive administrative pro-
cess containing numerous procedural protections.66
When enacting section 75-1.1, the North Carolina General As-
sembly adopted the "elusive" standards of the FTC Act and case
law, but rejected the FTC Act's procedural safeguards and added
remedies that can be extremely penal. Like the Commission, North
Carolina courts have been delegated the authority to sit like a
court of equity and review "the facts of each case and the impact
the practice has in the marketplace" in determining whether par-
ticular conduct violates section 75-1.1.67 Unlike the discretionary
authority given the Commission to fashion equitable remedies,
61. Cease and desist orders have been vacated by the courts of appeal on the
ground of vagueness. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 216-17
(9th Cir. 1979).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)-(m) (1976).
63. FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
64. Id.
65. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1919) (rejecting
vagueness attack on FTC Act); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
66. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
67. Johnson, 300 N.C. at 262-63, 266 S.E.2d at 621.
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North Carolina courts are required to award treble damages
against a defendant deemed by the court to have violated the act."
C. Fifteen of the Sixteen State Unfair Trade Practice Acts That
Authorize the Award of Multiple Damages Possess Features That
Ameliorate Their Punitive Effect or Give Regulated Parties No-
tice of the Type of Conduct Prohibited.
Numerous other states have adopted unfair trade practice
statutes based on the FTC Act. Under many of these statutes, pri-
vate civil actions are authorized. However, with one exception, all
of the other statutes possess features not present in section 75-1.1
that ameliorate their penal effect or give notice of the type of con-
duct prohibited.
At least sixteen state unfair trade practice statutes other than
section 75-1.1 authorize both private actions and the award of mul-
tiple damages. 9 At least five of these statutes have survived claims
of vagueness.70 Of those five decisions, only one involved a private
action where the award of treble damages was at issue.7"
Eight of the state statutes contain a "laundry list" of specifi-
cally identified violations.72 A statutory laundry, list "fairly ap-
68. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 547, 276 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1981).
69. Leaffer and Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts
or Practices: The Private Use of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 521 (1980).
70. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (1980), State of Alaska v. O'Neill Investigation,
Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 to 201-4 (Pur-
don 1971), Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Apsco System, Inc., 10 Pa. Commw.
138, 309 A.2d 184 (1973); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon Supp.
1986), Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.86.020 (1965), State v. Readers Digest Assn., 81 Wash.2d 259, 501 P.2d
290 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.18-
100.30 (West 1973), Carpets by the Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075
(E.D. Wis. 1975).
71. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980). Three of the other
decisions, Pennsylvania Apsco Systems, 10 Pa. Commw. 138, 309 A.2d 184 (1973),
Readers Digest Assn., 81 Wash.2d 259, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), appeal dismissed,
411 U.S. 945 (1973), and O'Neill Investigation, 609 P.2d 520 involved enforce-
ment actions by the state. The third, Carpets by the Carload, 368 F. Supp. 1075
(E.D. Wis. 1975) was a declaratory judgment action brought by the plaintiff after
an enforcement action had been initiated against it by the state attorney general.
72. (1) ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (1980); (2) D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904 (1981);
(3) GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(b) (1982); (4) OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02 (Page
1979); (5) 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-2(4) (Purdon 1971); (6) TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-18-104(b) (1984); (7) TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17,46(b) (Vernon 1980);
12
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prise[s]" a potential defendant of the type of conduct prohibited
by the statute, 3 and thus serves to satisfy the notice requirements
of due process. 4
Twelve of the state statutes expressly or by implication make
scienter an issue in the determination of whether multiple damages
are proper. 5 Statutes that make scienter an element of plaintiff's
case possess an attribute that has been found to insulate economic
regulation from vagueness attacks.7Eight of the state statutes grant private actions only to tradi-
tional consumers and not to corporations.7 7 Statutes that limit pri-
(8) WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18 (West 1973).
73. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980).
74. Similar to the "laundry list" concept, Ohio also restricts the award of
treble damages to cases where the practice (1) was declared to be deceptive or
unconscionable by the attorney general prior to the allegedly unlawful act by the
defendant or (2) was determined to be lawful by a court and committed by the
defendant after the court decision has been made available for the public inspec-
tion. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(B) (Page 1979).
75. (1) ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531 (1980) (treble damages for "willful" viola-
tions); (2) GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (1982) (treble damages for "intentional"
violations); (3) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409A (West Supp. 1986) (treble damages
if unfair act "knowingly used, after being put on notice by the director [of con-
sumer affairs]."); (4) MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A §§ 9(3), 11 (West 1985)
(treble damages for willful or knowing violation or bad faith refusal to make
tender of settlement); (5) OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.11 (Page 1979) (defendant
can limit recovery to actual damages upon proof that violation caused by good
faith error); (6) 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2(a) (Purdon 1971) (court may, in
its discretion, award up to three times the actual damage); (7) S.C. CODE ANN. §
39-5-140 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (treble damages if violation willful or knowing); (8)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(3)-(4) (1984) (treble damages for "knowing and
willful" violation; court may consider defendant's "good faith"); (9) TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1980) (three times actual damage where defend-
ant's conduct was "knowingly" committed); (10) VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2461
(1984) (a court may award exemplary damages up to three times the value of the
consideration given by the consumer); (11) WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090
(1965) (treble damages may be awarded by the court in the exercise of its discre-
tion); and (12) WIs. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(b)(2) (West 1973) (multiple damages
may be awarded in a private action after defendant has violated an injunction
obtained by the state).
76. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499. Two states also allow a de-
fendant to limit the damages recovered by the plaintiff to the amount offered by
the defendant at the commencement of the lawsuit as a good faith tender of set-
tlement. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(b); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A § 9(3).
77. (1) D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3901(a)(2), 3905(k) (1981); (2) GA, CODE ANN. §§
10-1-392(a)(2)-(3), -399(a) (1982); (3) MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (1985); (4)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to :8-12 (West Supp. 1985), Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J.
1986]
13
Farr: Unfair and Deceptive Legislation: The Case for Finding North Caro
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:421
vate actions for multiple damages to consumers are less penal in
effect "[g]iven the small dollar amounts involved in such
suits ... " 8 Treble damages are also more "remedial" in the
consumer context since, "it makes more economically feasible the
bringing of an action where the possible money damages are lim-
ited . . . .""
Under all of the multiple damage statutes except for North
Carolina and Hawaii,80 some attempt has been made to limit the
scope of the statute, to reduce the penal nature of the statute, or to
give defendants reasonable notice of what is prohibited. Only sec-
tion 75-1.1 and the Hawaii act give courts unbridled power to
make ad hoc decisions, which can potentially result in millions of
dollars in punitive damages."
Super. 365, 358 A.2d 473, 480 (1976); (5) OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01(A), (D),
1345.09 (Page 1979); (6) 73 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2(a) (Purdon 1971); (7)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 §§ 2451(a), 2461 (1984); (8) American Building Co. v. Norton,
640 S.W.2d 569, 575 (Tenn. 1982). In practical effect, the Washington statute also
limits private actions to consumers by placing a ceiling of $10,000 on the total
amount that can be awarded in treble damages. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090
(1965).
78. Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 549, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).
79. Id. North Carolina courts may also find useful a related limitation fash-
ioned by the Washington courts. Under the Washington act, a private plaintiff
must prove that defendant's conduct violates a separate state statute (and is
therefore contrary to an articulated public policy) or that defendant's conduct
"impacts the public interest." McRae v. Bolstad, 101 Wash. 2d 161, 165, 676 P.2d
496, 499 (1984). "A breach of a private contract ... whether the breach be negli-
gent or intentional, is not an act or practice affecting the public interest."
Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wash.2d 331, 334, 544 P.2d 88, 90 (1976) (emphasis
supplied). To satisfy this element, a plaintiff must prove that defendant's decep-
tive acts have the potential for repetition through evidence that others have been
injured by similar deceptive representations. McRae, 101 Wash. 2d at 165-66, 676
P.2d at 499-500.
80. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-1 (1976). The author has been unable to locate a
decision commenting on the constitutionally of the Hawaii act.
81. At least five other state unfair trade practice acts have survived vague-
ness attacks. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gym of America, Inc., 177 Colo. 97, 493
P.2d 660 (1972); Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1976);
Scott v. Association for Childbirth at Home, Ltd., 88 Ill.2d 279, 430 N.E.2d 1012
(1981); State v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 212 Kan. 668, 512 P.2d 416 (1973);
and Dare to be Great, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock, 511 S.W.2d 224
(Ky. 1974). All five of the challenged statutes authorized private actions, but did
not authorize awards of multiple damages. All of the cases construing the respec-
tive acts involved enforcement actions by public officers similar to FTC adminis-
trative actions and not private actions where damages were awarded. The Colo-
rado act (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105 (1974)) and the Kansas act (KAN. STAT. ANN.
14
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V. CONCLUSION
The delegation of broad authority to the Federal Trade Com-
mission to enjoin "deceptive" or "unfair" mass advertising has sur-
vived judicial review at least in part because of the strictly reme-
dial consequences that face respondents in FTC proceedings. It
does not necessarily follow that an identical delegation of policy-
making authority to the North Carolina courts should survive con-
stitutional scrutiny in all cases given the mandatory penal effect of
section 75-1.1.
One state superior court has found section 75-1.1 to be uncon-
stitutional.8 2 Several other courts have commented on the vague-
ness of section 75-1.1.s3 To show that a statute is facially invalid, a
party must carry the heavy burden of demonstrating that "the law
is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." 84 There may be
§ 50-626(b) (1984)) contain extensive "laundry lists" of specific violations. Finally,
under the Kansas and Florida acts, private actions may be brought only by con-
sumers and not corporations. See respectively, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-624(b), -634
(1984); Packaging Corp. International v. Travenol Laboratories, 566 F. Supp..
1480, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
82. United Virginia Bank v. Air-Lift Associates, Inc., No. 82CVS8786, slip.
op. at 6 (Wake County Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 1984). The judgment entered by the
superior court was affirmed on alternative grounds by the North Carolina Court
of Appeals. The court of appeals found it unnecessary to address the constitution-
ality of § 75-1.1 and struck that portion of the superior court's opinion as "sur-
plusage." United Virginia Bank v. Air-Lift Associates, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 315, 339
S.E.2d 90 (1986).
83. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "whatever the
limit of their reach . . . the words [of § 75-1.1] must mean something more than
an ordinary contract breach." United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 649
F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981). One panel of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals has stated that the language of the statute is "so
broad and vague. . . as to render the treble damage penalty provided by G.S. 75-
16 in a private action brought for violation of the vague language of G.S. 75-1.1 at
least of questionable [constitutional] validity." Hammers v. Lowes Co., 48 N.C.
App. 150, 154, 268 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1980). Another court has commented that the
act "is vague, has been the subject of widely varying judicial interpretations, and
is of questionable constitutionality." Terry's Floor Fashions v. Burlington Indus.,
568 F. Supp. 205, 216 (E.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd, 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985). Finally,
the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina has written that "[t]he constitutionality of [§ 75-1.1] is by no
means certain." Village Cable Inc. v. Oak Communications, Inc., No. C-82-805-D,
slip op. at 18 (M.D.N.C. July 11, 1984) (Ward, C.J.), aff'd, No. 84-2221, slip op.
(4th Cir. June 6, 1985).
84. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 497, (1922).
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circumstances where section 75-1.1 can be constitutionally applied
to commercial parties. 8 It is also apparent that the treble damage
remedy does not automatically render the act unconstitutional. 6
However, as a result of Marshall v. Miller, it is impossible to dis-
tinguish cases involving mere breaches of contract from cases in-
volving so-called "aggravating circumstances." Should the act sur-
vive constitutional review in breach of contract cases, similar sets
of facts in different cases could easily result in different findings by
different courts on the issue of liability. Where the result of arbi-
trary enforcement means millions of dollars to the unlucky defend-
ant who draws a consumer oriented judge, the gross unfairness of
the act becomes readily apparent.
The unfairness of section 75-1.1 should result in its amend-
ment by incorporating one or more of the restrictions found in the
unfair trade practice statutes of our sister states. Treble damages
may serve the interests of justice when a consumer would other-
wise be unable to finance litigation against a corporation. However,
treble damages are an injustice when they result in huge windfalls
to commercial plaintiffs at the expense of commercial defendants
who, despite having breached a contract, may have acted with the
best of intentions and in good faith. 7
85. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that proof of a Sherman
Act violation is sufficient to prove a violation of § 75-1.1. Itco Corp. v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 48 (4th Cir. 1983) aff'd on rehearing, 742 F.2d 170 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1191 (1985). On remand of the Itco case, the
district court rejected the contention that § 75-1.1 is facially unconstitutional.
Itco Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., No. 78-0004-CIV-8, slip op. at 10, 11 (E.D.N.C.
July 9, 1985). The court apparently concluded that the act was not unconstitu-
tional as applied since the defendant was charged with Sherman Act violations
and thus had fair notice of what was prohibited by § 75-1.1. Id. In contrast, when
a violation of the act is based upon an alleged breach of contract, defendants have
no notice of what distinguishes a mere breach from "substantially aggravating
circumstances".
86. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3283, (1985) (commenting
on the civil treble damage remedy available under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982)).
87. A statute that imposes a penalty without a scienter requirement "is little
more than 'a trap for those who act in good faith.'" Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 395 (1979) (quoting United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942)).
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